Volker
Perthes
German Institute for International and Security Affairs
May 7 2013,
ProjectSyndicate.com
BERLIN – The eruption of the Arab revolts in late 2010 and early
2011 put power relations among Middle Eastern countries in a state of flux, and
both winners and losers have emerged. But, given that the strengths and
weaknesses of most of the actors are highly contingent, the regional balance of
power remains highly fluid.
As that balance currently stands, Egypt continues to be one of the
region’s most influential actors, with the success or failure of its political
and economic transition affecting how other Arab countries develop. But Egypt
is weighed down by domestic concerns, including a plummeting economy and a
security situation in which the military is used for police tasks.
The
expansion of Egypt’s soft power will depend on the ability of its first
democratically elected government, led by President Mohamed Morsi, to take
difficult decisions and forge domestic consensus. Success in establishing
effective governance would establish a model that many of Egypt’s neighbors
would seek to emulate, at least partly.
In this respect, Turkey is a good example. Turkey’s power rests
primarily on its vibrant economy. Its impressive military strength is of
limited use as an instrument of power, and its political clout has been
overestimated, particularly in Syria. A rapprochement with Israel and, more
important, a lasting peace with its Kurdish population, would boost Turkey’s
regional influence.
Israel also remains an overall winner, despite the changing
strategic environment and its virtual lack of soft power in the region. The
impending fall of Israel’s most reliable enemy, Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad, concerns Israel almost as much as the loss of its ally, Egypt’s
former President Hosni Mubarak. With Israel’s economy and deterrent capability
stronger than ever, however, no regional player poses a genuine security threat
to Israel in the short term.
Meanwhile, Qatar’s diligent efforts to expand its influence over
the last two decades have paid off, with the country developing considerable
power of attraction. Since 2011, Qatar has scaled up its involvement in its
neighbors’ affairs, backing the Libyan revolution, the Egyptian government, and
the Syrian opposition.
But the Qataris may be overplaying their hand. Qatar has money,
but no other hard power, and it has been criticized for its interference in
Syria and its support for the Muslim Brotherhood. If Qatar fails to use its
resources wisely, it may lose the legitimacy that it needs to underpin its
patronage.
Meanwhile, Syria’s civil war highlights the loss of that country’s
once-considerable influence in the region. Instead, Syria has become the object
of a geopolitical struggle among other regional actors. But the efforts of the
Gulf states to arm the Syrian opposition are insufficient to set the conflict
on a definitive course, especially given the heavy weapons that the Assad
regime has at its disposal. And the opposition has not been able to appropriate
the reputation and clout that Assad has lost.
In fact, regardless of the balance of power between the regime and
its opponents, Syria probably will not reestablish a strong, centralized
government for decades, if ever. At best, Syria will emerge from the current
conflict with a decentralized or federal state; at worst, the country will go
the way of Somalia. Either way, Syria is currently firmly in the loser’s camp.
Iraq could
have been a winner, had it been able to translate the recovery of its oil
industry and the withdrawal of US troops into political stabilization and
regional influence. But, with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government
widely considered to be another authoritarian and sectarian regime, Iraq has
not been able to gain any soft power.
Moreover, the chances that Iraqi Kurdistan will achieve de facto or de jure independence are
greater than ever. Iraq’s Kurds may even be able to extend their influence into
Kurdish-populated northern Syria, thereby becoming a more influential regional
player than the Iraqi government in Baghdad.
Neighboring Iran seems to be the quintessential survivor. It has
coped with the international community’s increasingly stifling sanctions, while
maintaining its nuclear program and continuing to participate in the diplomatic
process with the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, plus Germany). Iran has strengthened its influence in Iraq,
and has helped to keep the Assad regime, a key ally, in power much longer than
expected.
But rising political polarization in the region could undermine
Iran’s standing. As regional conflicts are increasingly defined along
Sunni-Shia lines, it is becoming more difficult for Shia-dominated Iran to gain
influence in Sunni-majority countries. And Iran’s support for Assad’s brutal
regime in Syria is damaging further its once-considerable soft power in other
Arab countries.
Saudi Arabia can also be counted as a survivor, as it copes with
deep strategic insecurity stemming from Iran’s efforts to undermine its
position, social unrest in its neighbor and ally Bahrain, and the Muslim
Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt. Saudi leaders have also become
increasingly suspicious of their American allies, on whom the country’s
security depends.
At the same time, the Saudi leadership is facing significant
domestic challenges, including vast economic disparities, inadequate services,
growing frustration with the lack of political freedom, and a difficult
succession process within the royal family. Nevertheless, though Saudi Arabia’s
soft power is waning, its massive oil wealth will likely ensure that it remains
a regional heavyweight.
Non-state actors also play a crucial role in the Middle East’s
balance of power. Religious minorities have become more insecure. The
once-oppressed Kurds are gaining ground. Of the main transnational political
groups, the Muslim Brotherhood has been the clearest winner.
But success brings new challenges. Islamist-led governments must
deliver on the socioeconomic front, while building democratic institutions.
(Ironically, they will be able to claim success in having built a better state
only when they accept their first electoral defeat.) Indeed, the challenge
facing all of the region’s current winners is to translate today’s gains into
credible, long-term power.
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